Equity Incentives and Earnings Management
研究了银行业中CEO股权激励与盈余管理的关系，发现当资本比率接近监管最低要求时，高股权激励的经理更可能进行盈余管理，表明监管干预反而加剧了这种行为。
We examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on earnings management arising from chief executive officers’ equity incentives. We find that bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital ratios are closer to the minimums required by regulators. This finding indicates that, in the banking industry, potential regulatory intervention induces, rather than mitigates, earnings management arising from equity incentives.