Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders
目标公司面临信息不对称的竞标者时，通过序贯程序（先给信息优势方独家交易机会，被拒后再给劣势方或修改拍卖）能最大化交易价格，并可用交易保护机制增强承诺。
Target firms often face bidders that are not equally well informed, which reduces competition, because bidders with less information fear the winner's curse more. We analyze how targets should be sold in this situation. We show that a sequential procedure can extract the highest possible transaction price. The target first offers an exclusive deal to a better-informed bidder, without considering a less well-informed bidder. If rejected, the target offers either an exclusive deal to the less well-informed bidder, or a modified first-price auction. Deal protection devices can be used to enhance a target's commitment to the procedure. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.