Multidivisional firms, internal competition, and the merger paradox
传统并购模型假设合并企业合作最大化联合利润，但存在并购不盈利等悖论。本文允许母公司让各内部企业相互竞争，发现这种策略下并购对内部企业盈利、对外部企业不利、对社会有益，且最优策略取决于企业竞争方式是数量还是价格。
Abstract. Traditional modelling of mergers has the merged firms (insiders) cooperate and maximize joint profits. This approach has several unappealing results in quantity‐setting games, for example, mergers typically are not profitable for insiders, but are profitable for non‐merging firms (outsiders). We take a different approach and allow for a parent company that can play each insider off one another. In quantity‐setting games, with our approach mergers are profitable for insiders, unprofitable for outsiders, socially beneficial, and involve (in a non‐monopolizing merger) a small number of firms. Finally, we find that the optimal strategy depends on whether firms compete in quantity or prices.