Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships
分析了员工具有互惠偏好时的动态关系契约，发现慷慨的初始工资在员工临近退休时更重要，而早期阶段直接奖金激励更有效，两者应结合使用。
This paper analyzes a dynamic relational contract for employees with reciprocal preferences. A model of a long-term employment relationship is developed that implies that generous upfront wages activate the norm of reciprocity and then are more important when an employee is close to retirement. In earlier stages, direct incentives promising a bonus in exchange for effort are more effective. Hence, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should be used in combination. Moreover, a more competitive labor market may increase the utilization of reciprocity-based incentives. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by Hardegg’sche Stiftung, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190], and the Austrian Science Fund [Grant P 33307-G]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4657 .