Mistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting
分析有限商品交换经济中，代理人可能犯错时的联盟重新签约动态过程，证明在严格偏好下唯一随机稳定状态是瓦尔拉斯配置，而在无差异偏好下非核心循环可能稳定。
Abstract. In an exchange economy with a finite number of indivisible goods, we analyze a dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with small probability. We show first that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistake-free) process consist of (i) all core allocations as absorbing states, and (ii) cycles of non-core allocations. Next, we introduce a perturbed process, where the resistance of each transition is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes –do not improve – in the transition and of the seriousness of each mistake. If preferences are always strict, we show that the unique stochastically stable state of the perturbed process is the Walrasian allocation. In economies with indifferences, non-core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, while some core allocations are not.