Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good
研究一个决策者如何选择非排他性商品的特征，考虑消费者在估值和偏好两个维度上的差异，发现信息不对称时决策会偏向低估值或高不适用的消费者。
In this model, a principal decides whether to produce one indivisible good and which characteristics it contains. Agents are differentiated along two substitutable dimensions: a vertical parameter that captures their valuation for the good, and a horizontal parameter that captures their disutility when the characteristics are distant from their preferred ones. When valuations are private information, the principal produces a good with characteristics more on the lines of the preferences of the agent with the lowest valuation. Under asymmetric information on the horizontal dimension, the principal biases the decision in favor of the agent who incurs the highest disutility.