Conflicts in Bankruptcy and the Sequence of Debt Issues
研究了企业发行不同优先级债务的最优顺序，发现由于绝对优先权规则被违反，企业有动机交替发行不同优先级债务，模型预测与大量债务发行数据中的规律一致。
Abstract This paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues. Our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority, they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities, because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule (APR). When we introduce explicit costs of class conflict, the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt. The implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues. We test several other implications of our model as well.