Market selection in large economies: A matter of luck
在一个连续交易者且总禀赋有界的一般均衡模型中，研究了市场选择假说，发现风险态度影响交易者生存，且市场可能偏好信念错误的“幸运”交易者而非信念准确的“熟练”交易者。
In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect traders' survival and that markets can favor “lucky” traders with incorrect beliefs over “skilled” traders with accurate beliefs. My model allows for a clear distinction between luck and skills, and it shows that market selection forces induce efficient prices even when accurate traders do not survive in the long run.