On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity
研究声誉激励如何影响存在道德风险的市场，发现声誉能增强社会偏好对契约执行的正面作用，同时削弱其导致的价格刚性，从而增加互利交易、减少租金并提高市场对供需冲击的响应性。
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterised by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterised by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.