Stapled Financing, Value Certification, and Lending Efficiency
研究了目标公司财务顾问提供的钉住融资是否认证了目标价值，发现其对卖方股东财富有显著正向影响，尤其对逆向选择严重的目标更有效，且能帮助买方获得更低成本、更长期限的债务。
We examine whether financing commitments from a target firm’s financial advisor, in the form of stapled financing, provide certification of target value. Using a data set of leveraged buyouts spanning 2002–2011, and addressing endogeneity issues, we find that stapled financing has significant positive effects on sellers’ shareholder wealth, especially for targets suffering from greater adverse selection. Stapled financing facilitates deal financing by allowing buyers to obtain lower-cost and longer-maturity debt, and it is positively associated with bidding intensity. Investment banks offering stapled financing appear to trade off higher expected advisory fees against loss of lending efficiency ex post.