Markets, torts, and social inefficiency
研究寡头企业生产有安全属性的差异化产品，消费者可能受害并诉讼，赔偿因谈判无效率和法定上限而不完全。比较市场均衡与计划者仅设定安全标准时的安全投入和产量。
We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm‐level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability‐related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner who is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, would choose .