International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy
提出一个政府干预理论，解释在不完全竞争的国际市场中，为何政府会采取研发补贴或出口补贴等产业战略政策，以及这些政策如何影响国家福利和企业行为。
This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for "industrial strategy" policies such as R & D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. Domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries, although the subsidy-ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. Behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms.