Bank Finance versus Bond Finance
构建了一个存在代理成本的模型，其中异质性企业通过银行贷款或公司债券融资，银行在解决信息问题上比市场更有效。模型解释了美国和欧元区公司金融的长期差异，发现欧元区公共信息较少时拟合最佳。
We present a model with agency costs where heterogeneous firms raise finance through either bank loans or corporate bonds and where banks are more efficient than the market in resolving informational problems. We document some major long‐run differences in corporate finance between the United States and the euro area, and show that our model can explain those differences based on information availability. The model fits the data best when the euro area is characterized by lower availability of public information about corporate credit risk relative to the United States, and when European firms value more than United States firms banks’ flexibility and information acquisition role.