Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability
分析了一个两阶段信息扩散模型，比较了责任、撤回和授权三种监管框架对私人实验和采纳激励的影响，发现责任应被优先用于避免抑制产生巨大正外部性的活动，而授权监管应宽松使用。
We analyze the optimal mix of ex ante experimentation and ex post learning for the dynamic adoption of activities with uncertain payoffs in a two-phase model of information diffusion. In a first preintroduction phase, costly experimentation is undertaken to decide whether to adopt an activity or abandon experimentation. In a second stage following adoption, learning can continue possibly at a different pace while the activity remains in place; the withdrawal option is exercised following the accumulation of sufficiently bad news. We compare from a law and economics perspective the performance of three regulatory frameworks commonly adopted to govern private experimentation and adoption incentives: liability, withdrawal, and authorization regulation. Liability should be preempted to avoid chilling of activities that generate large positive externalities consistent with the preemption doctrine. Liability should be used to discourage excessive experimentation for activities that generate small positive externalities. Authorization regulation should be lenient whenever it is used consistent with the organization of regulation in a number of areas, ranging from product safety to antitrust. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.