The Performance of Analysts with a CFA® Designation: The Role of Human-Capital and Signaling Theories
比较了持有CFA资格与未持有该资格的卖方股票分析师的表现，发现CFA持证者预测更及时，但准确性结果不一，市场对小型公司中CFA持证者的反应更强，支持人力资本和信号理论。
ABSTRACT: This study compares the performance of sell-side equity analysts with and without a Chartered Financial Analyst® (CFA) designation. Using a large sample of forecasts, our tests indicate that CFA charterholders issue forecasts that are timelier than those of non-charterholders. The results for accuracy are mixed. We establish that while charterholders perform at statistically significant higher levels than non-charterholders in some tests, the economic significance of these differences is questionable. For a subsample of analysts, we find evidence that charterholders improve along the dimension of timeliness after they receive their CFA charter. This result provides support for a human-capital explanation in which charterholders improve their productivity during the CFA program. Finally, we show that the market reaction for smaller firms is stronger for charterholders than non-charterholders after controlling for timeliness, boldness, accuracy, and optimism. This result provides evidence consistent with “credentialism,” a variant of signaling theory in which a professional's education level provides a signal about the professional's quality to his or her clients.