Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden*
研究了瑞典三家核电站的联合所有权对市场竞争的影响，通过模型分析不同行为假设下的维护决策，发现夏季监管宽松时更易达成合谋。
I examine the anticompetitive effects of joint ownership by analyzing the operation of three Swedish nuclear plants. I formulate a model of optimal maintenance allocation given three behavioral assumptions: i) maximal collusion, where all owners’ profits on both nuclear and other output are jointly maximized; ii) Cournot competition, where the majority owners’ profits on both nuclear and other output are maximized; and iii) a divested solution, where all owners’ profits on nuclear output are maximized. Maximal collusion is only achieved during the summer, when regulatory oversight is less strict. During the winter, data is instead consistent with the divested solution.