Unplanned Purchases and Retail Competition
构建了一个模型，研究不对称多产品零售商如何竞争，其中消费者对购买概率有偏差信念并导致非计划购买，分析了损失领先定价、小零售商的最优产品组合以及禁止损失领先的影响。
I propose a framework in which asymmetric multiproduct retailers compete for one-stop shoppers who have biased beliefs about their future purchase probabilities (and so make unplanned purchases). One firm carries a full portfolio of products while the other carries an incomplete but endogenous one. Using this framework, I examine the phenomenon of loss leading, the optimal product portfolio of the smaller firm, and the effects of banning loss leading. Among other results, I show that there is a nonpredatory (and possibly procompetitive) justification for the observation that such larger firms may charge below cost on the core product lines of their smaller rivals.