Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation
研究发现银行在向竞争银行共享借款人信用评级前会进行操纵：对拥有正面私有信息的高质量借款人降级以保护信息租金，对有多家贷款方的低质量借款人升级以避免债权人挤兑，从而削弱了信用登记信息共享对信贷配置的积极作用。
We show that banks manipulate borrowers’ credit ratings before sharing them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of information disclosure of a public credit registry, we disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. We show that banks downgrade high-quality borrowers for which they have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks also upgrade low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders to avoid creditor runs. Our results suggest that credit ratings manipulation limits the positive effects of credit registries’ information disclosure on credit allocation.Received April 18, 2016; editorial decision April 1, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.