The Diminishing Benefits of U.S. Cross-Listing: Economic Consequences of SEC Rule 12h-6
研究了SEC规则12h-6使跨境上市公司更容易退出美国市场后，发现该规则导致投票溢价上升、股权融资和跨境上市溢价下降，削弱了美国监管承诺的价值。
On Mar. 21, 2007, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 to make it easier for cross-listed firms to deregister from the U.S. market and escape its regulatory costs. Using difference-in-difference (DD) tests, we find that, on average, Rule 12h-6’s passage induced an increase in voting premium, a decline in equity raising, and a decline in cross-listing premium. These effects are observed for exchange-listed firms and for firms from countries with weak investor protection. We conclude that although cross-listed firms are still valued at a significant premium over non-cross-listed firms, the rule decreased the value of commitment to the U.S. regulatory system.