Collateral, Taxes, and Leverage
通过估计一个动态模型，量化了抵押品约束与税收对企业资本结构的相对重要性，发现最优杠杆远离约束边界，财务灵活性成本约占资产的7.2%，与税收利益相当。
Abstract We quantify the importance of collateral versus taxes for firms' capital structures. We estimate a dynamic model in which a taxable firm seeks financing for investment, and a dynamic contracting environment motivates endogenous collateral constraints. Optimal leverage stays a safe distance from the constraint, balancing the tax benefit of debt with the cost of lost financial flexibility. We estimate this flexibility cost to be 7.2% of firm assets, a percentage that is comparable to the tax benefit. Models with different tax rates fit the data equally well, and leverage responds to the tax rate only when taxes are low. Received January 20, 2015; accepted January 8, 2016 by Editor Itay Goldstein.