THREAT AND PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC GOOD EXPERIMENTS
实验研究公共品博弈中，玩家在贡献前发出非约束性惩罚威胁能否提升合作与福利，发现威胁显著提高贡献，但效率改善仅出现在后期，且威胁与实际惩罚的差异会削弱其效果。
Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre‐play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non‐binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the latter periods. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation, and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats .