‘No Win, No Fee’, Cost‐shifting and the Costs of Civil Litigation: A Natural Experiment
研究了英国1995年引入“不赢不收费”方案及2000年修正案如何通过成本转移增加民事诉讼支出，利用雇主责任索赔数据发现2000年后成本上升约25%。
Expenditure on legal services has been rising and has attracted considerable policy attention in the UK. We argue that an important reason for this increase stems from the introduction of ‘no win no fee’ schemes in 1995 and a subsequent amendment's in 2000 which allowed claimants to shift additional costs onto losing defendants. We describe how this may have increased expenditure on legal claims and we test for the 2000 amendment effect using a regression discontinuity design on a dataset of employers’ liability claims. We find that costs increased by approximately 25% post 2000, consistent with our theoretical predictions.