Performance-Induced CEO Turnover
重新审视企业业绩与CEO更替的关系，提出“业绩引发的更替”概念，估计38%–55%的更替由业绩引发，远多于强制更替数量，并发现董事会行为与贝叶斯学习模型预测不符。
Abstract This paper revisits the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. Instead of classifying turnovers into forced and voluntary, we introduce performance-induced turnover, defined as turnover that would not have occurred had performance been “good.” We document a close turnover-performance link and estimate that 38%–55% of turnovers are performance induced. This is significantly more than the number of forced turnovers, though the two types of turnovers are highly correlated. Compared to the predictions of Bayesian learning models, learning about CEO ability appears to be slow, and boards act as if CEO ability (or match quality) was subject to frequent shocks.