Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives: Theory and evidence
构建生命周期模型分析美国人提前申领社保的现象，发现若延迟申领可获得一次性补偿，则提前申领者平均延迟一年，且该预测与调查结果一致，表明该改革可在不削减福利或增税的情况下鼓励延迟退休。
Abstract Many Americans claim Social Security benefits early, though this leaves them with lower monthly payments throughout retirement. We build a lifecycle model that closely tracks claiming patterns under current rules, and we use it to predict claiming delays if, by delaying benefits, people were to receive a lump sum instead of an annuity. We predict that current early claimers would defer claiming by a year given actuarially fair lump sums, and the predictions conform with respondents' answers to a strategic survey about the lump sum. In other words, such a reform could provide an avenue for encouraging delayed retirement without benefit cuts or tax increases. Moreover, many people would still defer claiming even for smaller lump sums.