Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design: The Case of Syndicated Loans
研究管理者过度自信是否影响贷款合同中业绩定价条款的使用，发现过度自信的管理者更倾向于发行利率递增型业绩敏感债务，且事后收益更少。
We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (performance-sensitive debt [PSD]). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue rate-increasing PSD than regular debt. They choose PSD with steeper performance-pricing schedules than those chosen by rational managers. We reject the possibility that overconfident managers have (persistent) positive private information and use PSD for signaling. Finally, firms seem to benefit less from using PSD ex post if they are managed by overconfident rather than rational managers. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.