Yes, No, Perhaps? Premium Risk and Guaranteed Renewable Insurance Contracts With Heterogeneous Incomplete Private Information
研究了异质性不完全私人信息如何解释保证可续保健康保险合同的有限存在，发现仅部分或无人购买此类合同，且风险厌恶和私人信息分布改善会增加购买概率。
The article shows that heterogeneous incomplete private information can explain the limited existence of guaranteed renewable health insurance (GR) contracts in an otherwise frictionless markets. We derive a unique equilibrium that can be of the form that either only a portion of the population or none will cover themselves against premium risk with a GR contract. Increased risk aversion, increased premium risk, and first‐order stochastic improvements of the distribution of private information increase the likelihood of positive take‐up. In case GR contracts are in demand, increased risk aversion and first‐order stochastic improvements of the distribution of private information lead to more individuals purchasing the GR contract.