The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations
构建了一个总统赦免的经济模型，利用1900-2005年数据检验发现，赦免申请受获赦概率、联邦囚犯数等因素正向影响，而假释人数、定罪到赦免时长有负向影响；民主党总统更可能批准赦免，犯罪率则抑制赦免。
This paper develops an economic model of presidential pardons (including commutations and other clemency grants). The model assumes that the number of pardons depends both on the expected benefits and costs of applying for a pardon and the president’s calculation of his net political benefits from granting a pardon. We test the model using data on presidential pardons over the 1900–2005 period. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that increases in the likelihood of being pardoned and in the number of federal prisoners (and persons released from prison) have a positive effect on applications and that increases in the number of persons paroled (a substitute for a pardon) and in the time from conviction to pardon (which lowers the benefits of a pardon) reduce the number of applications. We also find that Democratic presidents (who we expect to be less tough on crime) are more likely than Republican presidents to grant pardons, that the crime rate has a negative impact on pardons and that the number of pardons increased during Prohibition and during wartime and postwar periods.