Executive Overconfidence and Securities Class Actions
研究发现过度自信的CEO更可能引发证券集体诉讼，但良好的公司治理（如萨班斯-奥克斯利法案）能降低风险；诉讼后公司倾向避免聘用过度自信的CEO，且此类CEO会收敛行为。
Overconfident CEOs/senior executives tend to have excessively positive views of their own skills and their company’s future performance. We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in reckless or intentional actions/disclosures that give rise to securities class actions (SCAs). Empirical evidence is supportive: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives increase SCA likelihood, though litigation risk is ameliorated through improved governance, such as following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Post-SCA, companies are less likely to hire an overconfident CEO. Following an SCA, overconfident CEOs appear to moderate behavior and to reduce their litigation risk.