The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism
研究发现，最活跃的个人股东提案质量较低，偶尔因股东误判或董事职业担忧而通过并损害价值，但整体上股东提案在信息更充分的公司中能提升价值，表明更知情的投票可增加收益。
Abstract We show that there is cross-sectional variation in the quality of shareholder proposals. On average, proposals submitted by the most active individual sponsors are less likely to receive majority support, but they occasionally pass if shareholders mistakenly support them and may even be implemented due to directors’ career concerns. While gadfly proposals destroy shareholder value if they pass, shareholder proposals on average are value enhancing in firms with more informed shareholders. We conclude that more informed voting could increase the benefits associated with shareholder proposals.