Security, Trade, and Political Violence
利用以色列2008年对西岸进口限制作为准实验，发现安全动机的贸易限制导致制造业产出和工资下降，并增加了当地政治暴力事件，该效应解释了2008-2012年西岸16%的暴力事件。
Abstract This paper studies the effect of security-motivated trade restrictions on economic activity and political violence. We exploit the 2008 restrictions imposed by Israel on imports of selected goods to the West Bank as a quasi-experiment. We show that after 2008 (i) output and wages decrease differentially in manufacturing sectors that use restricted materials more intensively as production inputs, (ii) wages decrease in localities where employment is more concentrated in these sectors, and (iii) episodes of political violence are more likely to occur in these localities. This differential effect accounts for 16% of violent events that occurred in the West Bank from 2008 to 2012.