Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti‐Takeover Provisions
研究了反收购条款对收购概率、收购溢价和目标选择的影响，发现移除条款会同时提高收购概率和溢价，不存在权衡关系，溢价提升源于更好的匹配和协同效应。
ABSTRACT We study the effects of anti‐takeover provisions (ATPs) on the takeover probability, the takeover premium, and target selection. Voting to remove an ATP increases both the takeover probability and the takeover premium, that is, there is no evidence of a trade‐off between premiums and takeover probabilities. We provide causal estimates based on shareholder proposals to remove ATPs and address the endogenous selection of targets through bounding techniques. The positive premium effect in less protected firms is driven by better bidder‐target matching and merger synergies.