Bid-Ask Spreads in Multiple Dealer Settings: Some Experimental Evidence
通过实验室实验，研究多交易商市场中口头沟通和订单优先权对报价价差的影响，发现无优先权时沟通使价差扩大，有优先权时价差可能维持较宽，但允许价格竞争（如订单流支付）会缩小价差。
We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the behavior of quoted spreads in multiple-dealer markets.We manipulate verbal communication (not allowed and allowed) and order preferencing (not allowed, allowed, and allowed with order-flow payment) between eighteen sessions.Without preferencing, spreads are wider when communication is allowed.With preferencing (and no order-flow payments), individuals do not have incentives to narrow the spread and a wide spread may be maintained without a collusive agreement.However, spreads narrow somewhat when individuals are given the opportunity to compete using alternatives to price (that is, payment for order flow).