Innovation in Labor Contracts: On the Adoption of Profit Sharing inCanadian Labor Contracts
本文提出一个模型，证明工资与价格挂钩的劳动合同具有更长的最优合同期限，因此更可能采用绩效相关薪酬。加拿大集体谈判协议的数据支持这一预测：指数化合同的期限更长，采用绩效薪酬的可能性是其他合同的两倍以上。
I present a model in which I show that labor contracts with wages indexed to prices have longer optimal contract lengths and therefore are more likely to adopt performance‐related pay. There is empirical support for these predictions in Canadian collective‐bargaining agreements. Contract durations are longer in indexed contracts. Performance‐related pay is more than twice as likely to be adopted and present in indexed contracts and more likely to be adopted in contracts with longer durations.