A pricing mechanism to improve capacity utilisation in ridesharing
针对拼车平台低载客率问题，提出一种定价机制和决策规则，激励乘客加入大拼车池，同时考虑绕路和共享空间的不便，确保公平性。
Low vehicle occupancy is an issue faced by many ridesharing platforms. One of the ways to address this issue is to design a pricing mechanism that incentivises riders to join large-size pools. In this study, we propose a pricing mechanism and a decision rule to aid the platforms in achieving high capacity utilisation (forming large-size pools), even in the presence of rider inconveniences. We factor inconveniences due to both detouring and sharing of personal space while designing the mechanism. The proposed mechanism incentivises riders to join the “largest-size”pool and also ensure that no rider benefits at the cost of others. The decision rule helps to identify the right participants to share a ride. We employ cooperative game theory for this study.