Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
针对大股东与公司绩效之间的内生性问题，利用大股东倾向于投资邻近公司这一地理特征，构建了基于公司总部附近富裕人口密度的工具变量，分离出大股东的选择效应与处理效应。
Abstract Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test an empirical framework that allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders. Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using this empirical observation, we develop an instrument (the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s headquarters) for the presence of large, nonmanagerial individual shareholders in firms. These shareholders have a large impact on firms, controlling for selection effects.