Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets
构建了一个多期代理模型，研究投机性股票市场中基于股票的薪酬如何激励管理者追求短期股价表现，从而损害长期基本面价值，为理解企业危机提供了不同于“租金提取观”的视角。
We present a multiperiod agency model of stock-based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long-run fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective on the recent corporate crisis than the “rent extraction view” of executive compensation. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.