LAND USE REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXAS LODGING INDUSTRY*
利用得克萨斯州中档连锁酒店的微观数据，构建动态进入退出模型，发现严格管制虽增加成本，但连锁酒店预期竞争对手减少而仍进入高管制市场，消费者最终承担更高价格。
This article examines the anticompetitive effects of land use regulation using microdata on midscale chain hotels in Texas. I construct a dynamic entry–exit model that endogenizes hotel chains’ reactions to land use regulation. My estimates indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases costs considerably. Hotel chains nonetheless enter highly regulated markets even if entry probabilities are lower, anticipating fewer rivals and hence greater market power. Consumers incur the costs of regulation indirectly in the form of higher prices.