Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?
分析在信息不对称和道德风险下，风险敏感的激励相容存款保险是否可行，发现除非存款保险人是经济中最不厌恶风险的参与者，否则在竞争放松管制的环境中无法实现公平定价。
We analyze risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard. Without deposit-linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive, deregulated environment, except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy. We establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital; the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well. This suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk-sensitive deposit insurance.