What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives
研究了共同基金的资金流是否反映了中介经纪人的激励，发现销售费用分成和附属关系显著影响资金流入，且销售费用分成能预测较差业绩。
ABSTRACT We ask whether mutual funds’ flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers’ shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these payments to brokers on funds’ inflows, particularly when the brokers are not affiliated. Tracking these investments forward, we find load sharing, but not revenue sharing, to predict poor performance, consistent with the different incentives these payments impart. We identify one benefit of captive brokerage, which is the recapture of redemptions elsewhere in the family.