The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
研究了在CEO选拔、解聘和留任的模型中，大股东监督如何影响CEO薪酬结构，发现监督更强的企业更易解聘低能力CEO，其薪酬对业绩更敏感，且监督实践的扩散会推高所有企业的CEO薪酬。
We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.