Politics, State Ownership, and Corporate Investments
利用印度宪法规定的选举日程，发现国有企业在选举年宣布更多资本支出项目，尤其在基础设施领域和竞争激烈的选区，但这些项目公告回报为负，损害股东价值。
Abstract We document a political cycle in the investment decisions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by using the constitutionally mandated election schedule in India as a source of exogenous variation in politicians’ incentive to cater to voters. Using a project-level investment database, we find that SOEs announce more capital expenditure projects in election years, especially in infrastructure, and in districts with close elections, high-ranking politicians, and left-wing incumbents. SOE projects in election years have negative announcement returns, suggesting a loss in shareholder value. These patterns are not seen in nongovernment firms or in off-election years. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.