Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle
构建了互联网骨干网竞争框架，分析接入费如何影响网站与消费者的通信成本分配及流量，发现运营商在广泛环境下按离网成本定价，并比较了社会最优与私人最优接入费。
The paper develops a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. The paper analyzes the impact of the access charge on competitive strategies in an unregulated retail environment. In a remarkably broad range of environments, operators set prices for their customers as if their customers' traffic were entirely off-net. The paper then compares the socially optimal access charge with the privately desirable one. Finally, when websites charge micropayments, or when websites sell goods and services, the impact of the access charge on welfare is reduced; in particular, the access charge is neutral in a range of cicumstances.