Financing Auction Bids
研究竞拍者通过债务融资支付现金出价时，拍卖是否还能实现效率。结论是，在竞争性债务融资下拍卖永远无法达到效率，只有特定条件（如完美信息、股权市场或特殊利率合同）才可能有效，说明金融市场逆向选择阻碍了拍卖的资源配置效率。
errors are our own. FINANCING AUCTION BIDS In most large auctions, bidders require Þnancing to pay for their cash bid. If bidders have equal access to competitive Þnancing, then the expectation is that the auction will be efficient and behave as predicted by the seminal work in auction theory. We show that auctions are never efficient if the bidders use competitive debt Þnancing. Financed auctions may be efficient, but require either perfect and complete information, perfect ex-ante information and competitive equity markets, or very speciÞc interest rate contracts and restricted access to capital markets, and all bidders must borrow. Our work suggests that the adverse selection in Þnancial markets makes it difficult to attain efficient allocations in the auction. FINANCING AUCTION BIDS The majority of auctions in the world require cash bids. In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay the amount they wish to bid. As a result, bidders Þnance part of their bids. This was true in the FCC bandwidth auctions, in which the government sold sections of the