Stock Option Repricing and Its Alternatives: An Empirical Examination
研究CEO股票期权重新定价及其替代方案（期权授予、股票授予、不作为）的决定因素，发现重新定价旨在增强薪酬对股价的敏感度并降低对波动的敏感度，且更常见于年轻及人力资本密集型行业，而非出于代理成本考虑。
Abstract In this paper I examine the likelihood of CEO stock option repricing and its alternatives: namely, option grant, stock grant, and “do nothing.” Multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility. Moreover, repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important. Finally, I find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing. My results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention, and not by agency cost considerations.