Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday Borrowing
通过发薪日贷款机构的实地实验，发现让借款人更全面地考虑贷款成本（如累计费用）的信息披露，能使其未来4个月内的借款减少11%，且政策成本较低。
ABSTRACT Can psychology‐guided information disclosure induce borrowers to lower their use of high‐cost debt? In a field experiment at payday stores, we find that information that makes people think less narrowly (over time) about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforcing the adding‐up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans reduces the take‐up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent 4 months. Although we remain agnostic as to the overall sufficiency of better disclosure policy to “remedy” payday borrowing, we cast the 11% reduction in borrowing in light of the relative low cost of this policy.