Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts
利用瑞典清洁服务采购数据，分析从选美拍卖转向第一价格密封投标和评分拍卖的制度改革，发现采购成本未显著变化，但进入行为、偏袒效应等因素相互抵消。
Abstract We analyze a regime change from beauty contests to first‐price sealed‐bid and scoring auctions, using Swedish data on public procurement of cleaning services. In beauty contests, the lowest bid often lost, leaving substantial money on the table. The procurement costs were similar before and after the regime change: (i) Entry strongly decreases the procurement cost but did not change. Entry would have decreased had the municipalities not adjusted the objects of auctions. (ii) Municipalities favored in‐house suppliers in the old regime, leading to more aggressive bidding by others. With favoritism reduced, these changes balanced each other out.