Markets for ideas: prize structure, entry limits, and the design of ideation contests
建立了一个创意竞赛的实证模型，利用大型广告平台的数据模拟不同奖金结构和参赛限制对竞赛结果的影响，为设计大规模竞赛提供指导。
Abstract I develop an empirical model of idea generation contests with heterogeneous participants and endogenous entry, fit the model to data from a platform used by major advertisers, and simulate counterfactual contest designs. The empirical model resolves ambiguous predictions yielded by contest theory about the effects of different prize structures on contest outcomes. Simulations reveal the impact of strategies that hold fixed total award and balance competition by handicapping advantaged participants. Increasing the number of prizes while restricting the number of prizes per participant can improve outcomes for the platform. The results provide guidance for the design of large contests.