Do Business Borrowers Benefit from Bank Bailouts?: The Effects of TARP on Loan Contract Terms
研究了银行救助（TARP）对企业借款人的影响，发现救助银行在贷款金额、利率、期限、抵押和契约五个方面提供了更优惠的条款，风险较高的借款人受益更多，但小企业和未上市企业受益较少。
Abstract We investigate benefits to business borrowers from bank bailouts, specifically the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Applying difference‐in‐difference methodology to loan‐level data, we find more favorable borrower contract terms in five dimensions, spread, amount, maturity, collateral, and covenants, suggesting increased credit supply at the intensive margin by bailed‐out banks. Findings are robust to dealing with endogeneity and other issues. Riskier borrowers benefit more, consistent with moral hazard exploitation. Small and unlisted borrowers benefit less, suggesting fewer benefits for financially constrained firms. Benefits accrue to both relationship and nonrelationship borrowers. Results contribute to the research and policy debates on bank bailouts.