Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
研究1996至2004年美国大公司欺诈案，发现欺诈主要靠员工、媒体和行业监管者等非传统角色揭发，而非投资者或审计师；金钱激励对员工举报作用大，声誉激励除大案记者外普遍弱。
ABSTRACT To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.