Optimal Taxation, Marriage, Home Production, and Family Labor Supply
在一个考虑婚姻市场和不完全可转移效用的集体模型中，研究了最优所得税设计，发现已婚夫妇的最优税收系统具有负联合性，且福利收益随性别工资差距增大而增加。
An empirical approach to optimal income taxation design is developed within an equilibrium collective marriage market model with imperfectly transferable utility. Taxes distort time allocation decisions, as well as marriage market outcomes, and the within household decision process. Using data from the American Community Survey and American Time Use Survey, we structurally estimate our model and explore empirical design problems. We allow taxes to depend upon marital status, with the form of tax jointness for married couples unrestricted. We find that the optimal tax system for married couples is characterized by negative jointness, although the welfare gains from jointness are modest. These welfare gains are then shown to be increasing in the gender wage gap, with taxes here, as in the case of gender based taxation, providing an instrument to address within household inequality.